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Apart: The Decline of 
Centralized Collective 
Bargaining 
Richard B. Freeman and Robert S. Gibbons 
The centralized system is a catastrophe. LO cannot deliver wage 
restraint. We’ll go for anything else wherever it leads. 
-SAF  EMPLOYER ASSOCIATION REPRESENTATIVE,  1990 
Provided it is given the opportunity [the traditional system] will 
continue to serve both sides . . . for years to come 
-LO  UNION REPRESENTATIVE, 1987 
From the 1970s through the mid-l980s, many economists extolled the virtues 
of  centralized bargaining arrangements. Crouch  (1985), Tarantelli  (1986), 
Bruno  and  Sachs (1985), Olson (1990), Calmfors and Driffil  (1988), and 
Soskice (1990) among others stressed that centralized bargaining can intemal- 
ize the negative externalities of sectoral union-management bargaining such as 
inflationary wage and price increases or unemployment. Empirical studies of 
macroeconomic responses to the 1970s oil shocks found that centralized sys- 
tems had better unemployment-wage trade-offs and unemployment and infla- 
tion outcomes than systems where unions operate as limited special interest 
groups and at least as good outcomes as highly decentralized systems.‘ Some 
countries with decentralized union movements, such as Australia, sought to 
centralize labor relations. Analysts in other countries, such as the United King- 
dom, suggested that their country would  do better with a more centralized 
mode of wage setting (Layard 1991). The International Labour Organisation 
endorsed tripartite national agreements as a mode of addressing labor market 
problems. 
Richard B. Freeman holds the Herbert Ascherman Chair in Economics at Harvard University. 
He is also director of the Labor Studies Program at the National Bureau of Economic Research 
and executive programme director for comparative labour market institutions at the London School 
of Economics’ Centre for Economic Performance. Robert S. Gibbons is professor of economics 
at the Johnson Graduate School of Management at Cornell University and a research associate of 
the National Bureau of  Economic Research. 
Part of the research in this paper is based on fieldwork at FIEF The paper has benefited from 
detailed discussions with many specialists from Swedish labor and management organizations, 
including LO, SIF, Metall, SAF, and SVF, and with academic researchers. 
1. For studies finding better performance for centralized systems, see Bruno and Sachs (1985) 
or Crouch (1985). For studies showing that centralized systems yield better outcomes than systems 
with local bargaining or considerable state intervention in wage setting and similar outcomes to 
decentralized systems, see Calmfors and Driffil (1988) and Freeman (1988). 
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Despite the reputed virtues of  centralized bargaining, however, many cen- 
tralized arrangements  fell into disarray  in  the  1980s. Country after country 
moved toward more decentralized bargaining (Katz 1993). Italy abandoned the 
scala mobile, which had been the major centralizing force in its wage-setting 
system. New Zealand introduced legislation that greatly weakened its collec- 
tive bargaining  system. In France,  there was  a huge  increase in plant-level 
agreements. Australian unions and employers sought more company and plant 
negotiations.  Perhaps most striking, Sweden abandoned the peak-level  wage- 
bargaining system that had  served it since the  1950s. In  1983, the Swedish 
metalworkers  and  Volvo  withdrew  from centralized  negotiations,  and  bar- 
gaining lurched thereafter toward the company and sector level. The central 
union and management groups alternated between increasingly weak central 
agreements and complete abandonment of peak negotiations. 
What explains the retreat from the centralized bargaining that seemed so 
fruitful in the  1970s? Are centralized wage-setting arrangements intrinsically 
less stable than decentralized bargaining? Did the costs of centralized arrange- 
ments rise relative to their benefits? What determines whether labor and firms 
“get together” or “break apart” in peak-level negotiations? 
This paper examines these questions, paying particular attention to the de- 
cline in peak-level bargaining in Sweden. We develop a model of centralized 
bargaining among independent unions and firms that treats the costs as well as 
the benefits of centralization. Our analysis stresses that central negotiators have 
neither  the  instruments  nor  the  information  needed  to  tailor  national 
agreements to the particular circumstances of  individual industries or enter- 
prises and thus must allow for some “wage drift” to maintain flexibility. But 
drift opens the door for defection by  local bargaining pairs, which threatens 
the viability of  centralized arrangements. We  argue that the more variegated 
the economic environment, the greater is the equilibrium level of wage drift, 
and the stronger is the incentive for some local pair to defect. We attribute the 
decline in centralized bargaining in the 1980s to two forces that increased the 
dispersion of the local conditions  covered by  the  central bargain-growing 
unionization of new groups, such as white-collar workers, and market forces 
favoring greater wage differentials-and  to the decline in the threat of  infla- 
tion, which was an initial motivation for centralized bargaining.2 While simple, 
our model captures  some of the major elements of the  decay  in peak-level 
2. We  recognize that the paper falls short of  giving a “complete” model of centralized bar- 
gaining, in which several unions voluntarily give the right to bargain to a union federation and 
determine a bargaining stance for the federation; several employers voluntarily give the right to 
bargain to an employer federation and determine a bargaining stance for the employers’ group; the 
union confederation and employer federation reach a centralized agreement; and the local parties 
concur or defect from the central agreement. Developing such an analysis is extremely difficult 
(for the problems of trying to capture too much, see Elster [1989]) and risks losing insights in a 
full “general equilibrium”-type  story. Our goal is the more limited one of  laying out selected 
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bargaining in Sweden and, we hope, illuminates the decentralization of collec- 
tive bargaining elsewhere. 
10.1  The Basic Framework: Centralization versus Flexibility 
Most analyses of  centralization stress the benefits of  treating externality 
problems  in  wage  determination (such  as  inflationary  wage-price spirals) 
through peak-level bargaining arrangements (e.g., Flanagan 1987; Calmfors 
1987; Calmfors and Driffil 1988; Calmfors and Forslund 1990; Calmfors and 
Horn 1986; and Horn and Wolinsky 1988a, 1988b). What is less stressed in 
the literature is that centralized arrangements cost an economy flexibility and 
require that the center monitor and police settlements reached by independent 
bargaining pairs that have information unavailable to the center. If  central bar- 
gainers had the same information as local bargainers, centralization should 
increase social well-being by  leading to an efficient solution. With full infor- 
mation, local parties would give negotiating rights to the center, which would 
set wages, just as might an omniscient wage- or price-control agency. Devia- 
tions from the settlement would be instantly detected and potentially punished, 
for instance, through fines. Centralized bargaining would be a superior way to 
restrain aggregate wages, compared to macroeconomic policies that operate 
largely through unemployment. 
The problem is that central bargainers never have the same information as 
do local bargainers and thus cannot be certain whether any wage (or price) 
change that deviates from the central agreement does so because of local mar- 
ket conditions unknown to the center or because local bargainers defected from 
the agreement. In one state of the world, for example, the market might require 
a 0 percent wage increase for efficiency so that a 2 percent increase in sector 
A would reflect defection from a central agreement that had, say, a 0 percent 
wage inflation goal. In  another state, however, a 2 percent increase might be 
needed for efficient production so that a 0 percent increase would be an  inflex- 
ibility that would reduce output by  failing to induce workers to move to sector 
A (or to work hard, or to invest in skills, or the like), for reasons unknown to 
and not verifiable by the center. These considerations yield the following: 
Basic Point 1. An ideal central wage-setting system must allow deviations from 
the frame agreement so that local parties can take account of conditions un- 
known to the center. 
This is commonly done in centralized bargaining with a multilevel system 
of wage setting. For simplicity, we consider two levels. At the first level, central 
bodies determine appropriate aggregate wage changes on the basis of national 
economic conditions. For example, in Sweden during the heyday of centralized 
bargaining, the main union federation (LO, Landsorganisationen) and employ- 
ers’  association  (SAF,  Svenska Arbetsgivareforeningen) reached peak-level 348  Richard B. Freeman and Robert S. Gibbons 
agreements that  set the frame for lower-level industry and firm bargaining. 
Once the frame is set, local unions cannot strike, and firms cannot lock out 
workers to obtain a wage settlement that differs from the frame, but the two 
sides can agree to further wage changes on the basis of local conditions, pro- 
ducing  wage  drift.  What  distinguishes  drift  from  other  negotiated  wage 
changes is that it arises from a Pareto-improving agreement by the local union 
and employer. In essence, the central agreement determines the threat point in 
local bargaining and guarantees that negotiated drift will benefit both sides, as 
neither can use economic force (such as a strike) to gain a bigger share of 
the pie. In Sweden and other countries with centralized wage arrangements, a 
substantial proportion of  wage changes normally consisted of  positive wage 
drift. 
Unfortunately for the center, there are two ways in which both local parties 
can benefit by wage drift. They can agree to market-efficient wages that raise 
output and joint surplus. Or they can bargain for inflationary wage (and price) 
gains that redistribute income from the rest of  society to them. Changes in 
wages in any sector i (y)  thus consist of three parts: the common frame wage 
inflation (W);  deviation or drift due to market conditions (DM,); and drift due 
to defect strategies (DD,). In an ideal world, one could imagine that the com- 
mon frame agreement should be set so that E(DMJ = 0: some sectors would 
increase wages by more than the frame, while others would increase wages by 
less owing to their particular market conditions, balancing out to zero net drift. 
Furthermore, in this ideal world, DD, would be zero: no one would defect. If 
local parties chose only economically efficient drift, then centralization would 
yield a first-best optimum-the  optimal aggregate wage inflation and the opti- 
mal change in relative wages. 
Knowing that  some drift is likely to be efficient and other drift likely to 
reflect defection, the center must develop a strategy of “allowable” drift. If the 
center does nothing to penalize deviations, the incentive to defect is likely to 
be high, leading to a breakdown of the agreement and the loss of the benefits 
of centralization. At the other extreme, if the center prevents all deviations, the 
economy loses from inflexibility. Figure 10.1 depicts the problem. The hori- 
zontal axis measures centralization on a scale from zero to one, where a value 
of 0 represents a totally decentralized wage-setting system, while a value of  1 
represents a totally centralized system. Intermediate values reflect differences 
in the leeway given local bargainers to deviate from the frame agreement be- 
cause the center either imposes different penalties for deviation or allocates 
different amounts of resources (from moral suasion to side payments) to reduce 
deviation. The vertical axis measures the benefits and costs from centralized 
wage setting. Benefits are a rising parabola on the assumption that inflation 
costs follow a quadratic loss function. Costs fall with increasing centralization 
until point M,  then rise. The fall reflects the possibility that some centralization 
may be necessary to control monopoly or monopsonistic wage setting or inef- 
ficient “rent sharing” between profitable firms and their workers. The rise rep- 349  The Decline of  Centralized Collective Bargaining 
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Fig. 10.1  Benefits and  costs of centralization 
resents the fact that high degrees of centralization extract a large cost in terms 
of  lost flexibility. Absent any costs of  flexibility, optimal centralization is  1 
since it minimizes wage inflation.  Absent inflation costs, optimal centralisation 
is M (= 0 if  there are no dangers of inefficient rent sharing). Given a trade- 
off  between the benefits of  centralization and the loss of  flexibility, optimal 
centralization is M* > M. The wider the gap between the benefit and cost 
curves, the more beneficial and stable will centralized wage setting be, given 
“random” shifts in those cur~es.~ 
This framework sets the stage for analyzing the three elements of centralized 
wage setting: the benefits of centralization from internalizing the externalities 
of local agreements; the costs of centralization due to lost flexibility; and the 
process of controlling or limiting defection from a frame agreement. 
10.2  The Benefits of Centralization 
Why should local unions or firms voluntarily give the right to bargain to a 
higher-level organization? The most widely mentioned reason invokes a pris- 
oner’s dilemma (or other externality) model of wage settlements: lower-level 
bargaining pairs choose between socially desirable restraint in wage setting or 
inflationary settlements:  Absent centralization, they end up at a noncoopera- 
tive inflationary outcome. By internalizing the costs of inflationary settlements, 
centralized bargaining should, by contrast, produce the cooperative settlement. 
3. The curves in the exhibit reflect two underlying relations: (i) the effect of centralization on 
wage inflatiodinappropriate wage structures and (ii) the welfare costs of  each. Thus, the curves 
will shift whenever centralization becomes morelless effective in altering the outcomes or when 
the outcomes become morelless costly to the economy. 
4.  Centralization has other potential benefits as well. It can reduce labor disputes by  bringing 
the costs of third parties to bear on the disputees. If  can minimize the inefficiency costs of  local 
monopoly union wage setting or monopsonistic employer wage setting. Also, it insures workers 
against wage losses due to negative shocks, and ensures that firms benefit from positive shocks, 
because wages do not respond. Regressions show that industry wage changes are uncorrelated 
with changes in value added per worker in Sweden but highly correlated in the United States and 
that Swedish wages are only modestly correlated with such things as firm size, profitability, etc. 
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The major benefit of centralization is presumably reductions in wage inflation, 
but any gain due to internalizing an externality can demonstrate how forming 
a central organization can produce benefits in collective bargaining. Since we 
do not want to develop a full macro model to assess the costs of inflation, we 
briefly analyze the externality created by wage settlements that result from an 
unemployment benefit system. 
Consider the following two-sector, two-union model. Labor is the only fac- 
tor of production, and union i is the monopoly supplier of labor to firm  i.  Union 
i has N, members and seeks to maximize its members'  income (or indirect 
utility, more generally), which depends on wages, y,  the probability members 
work in the sector, P(W,),  and the unemployment benefit they get, b. 
Decentralized bargaining proceeds as follows: unions choose wages sepa- 
rately; firms choose prices and employment; and workers get W,  or b. Bar- 
gaining under a union federation differs only in the first stage: unions bargain 
between themselves over a wage vector; firms choose prices and employment; 
and workers get W,  or b. In brief, we model centralization not as a change in 
the parties'  preferences (such as union  i suddenly caring about members of 
union j)  but rather as a change in the game the parties play (bargaining with 
each other first rather than individually with firms). This modeling strategy 
parallels Grossman and Hart's  (1986) observation that the best way to model 
changes in vertical integration is to analyze how they affect the structure of 
interactions between parties rather than their preferences. 
To keep things simple, this model is based on monopoly-union behavior. In 
both the decentralized and the federation cases, given wages from the first 
stage we solve the last two stages of the model by backward induction. In the 
decentralized case, the first-stage wages are then given by  the Nash equilib- 
rium of the wage-choice game between the unions, whereas in the federation 
case these wages are given by the Nash bargaining solution. Since in this model 
the  union  federation has  the  instruments that  the  individual unions  have 
(namely, one wage per sector), both unions are better off in the federation case. 
The externality in the decentralized case is the cost of b paid by nonmembers 
of each union. To see this, contrast a union whose members pay no taxes to the 
unemployment benefit fund with a union that has a fully experience-rated fund, 
where workers pay the full cost. 
If all unemployment benefits come from taxes on other workers, the union 
maximizes pW + (1 -  p)b.  It ignores the tax burden created by b. The first- 
order condition is W = b -  p/p'. If, by  contrast, the unemployment benefit 
system is fully funded by its members, the union maximizes the after-tax in- 
come received by  members, (1 - t)pW + (1 -  p)b, subject to the budget 
constraint that taxes paid by those working equals the unemployment benefits 
received by jobless members, tpW = (1 -  p)b.  This calls for maximizing pU: 
yielding the standard revenue-maximizing  result: W = -p/p'; that is, the union 
raises wages until the elasticity of labor demand, -  Wp'/p,  equals one. 351  The Decline of Centralized Collective Bargaining 
I  \W=-p/p‘ 
Employment 
Fig. 10.2  The effect of a union federation 
Figure 10.2 shows how the choice of wages in these two cases affects em- 
ployment (output). In the free-rider case, the union chooses the wage Wb = b 
-  p/p’,  and the firm chooses Eb;  in the fully funded case, the union chooses U: 
and the firm chooses E. The lost output is the trapezoid W,WEE,. It is larger 
the greater the level of b and the more elastic the demand curve. The magnitude 
of the gain from internalizing funding of the unemployment system through a 
union federation can be sizable since centralization reduces unemployment. 
Extending the analysis to a case where a percentage of the tax burden of 
financing own-member unemployment is paid by union ik  members is simple 
and makes clear that changing the structure of bargaining from decentralized 
firm-union pairs to a central union federation is beneficial because it forces 
each union to internalize the cost of unemployment benefits. 
10.3  The Costs of Inflexibility 
There are two ways in which inflexibility in wage setting can reduce eco- 
nomic well-being. First, it can lead to a misallocation of  labor between ex- 
panding and contracting sectors. For simplicity, consider a two-sector econ- 
omy that is in  full employment. Each sector faces an upward-sloping labor 
supply schedule, owing to heterogeneity among workers in the costs of mobil- 
ity, preferences, or skills. The elasticity of demand in sector A is h, while the 
elasticity of supply is e. When demand shifts upward by X‘, as in figure 10.3a, 
the wage should rise by  X’l(e + h),  inducing an increase in employment of 
WL. But centralized bargaining does not allow sector A to raise its wage. The 
result is that neither employment nor output in the sector increases. Instead of 
E’ persons working in sector A, E work in the sector. The social loss is a stan- 
dard welfare triangle set by  the gap between the value of adding additional 
workers to sector A and their reservation wage/the opportunity value of  their 
time for working in B. Too many people remain in sector B, and too few (none) 
move to sector A. Misallocation losses of this sort are usually viewed as being 
of second-order  importance compared to the costs of lost output due to unem- 
ployment or the costs of wage inflation. 352  Richard B. Freeman and Robert S. Gibbons 
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1  -COMPETITIVE  CHANGE 
CHANGE  DUE  TO  INFLEXIBLE WAGES 
Fig. 10.3  The costs of inflexibility 
But inflexibility in wage setting can also produce "first-order'' effects in the 
form of wasted resources that show up in unemployment or possibly inade- 
quate work effort that reduces output just as does unemployment. Consider, for 
example, what happens when demand for labor falls in sector A from D' to D 
(see fig. 10.3~).  With rigid wages, employment will drop from E'  to E"  rather 
than to E, as it would in a flexible wage regime. Thus, E" -  E'  more workers 
are displaced from the sector because of  inflexible wages. Since wages are 
fixed in sector B, these workers will end up unemployed, barring macroeco- 
nomic changes that might alter the real cost of labor in both sectors. Inflexible 
relative wages produce inflexible real wages and joblessness that would have 
been avoided had sector A been free to reduce pay in the face of the decline in 
demand or had sector B been able to reduce wages to hire those displaced 
from A. 
Inflexibility in wages can also have first-order effects on an economy by 
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wages. Consider again an economy that has full employment and the “right” 
wage structure. Let work requirements change in a particular sector so that the 
supply of labor shifts from S to S’,  as in figure 10.3b: individuals want a higher 
wage in the sector because the work has become more difficult, work condi- 
tions have eroded, and so on, relative to other sectors. The market-clearing 
wage is W‘,  and the market-clearing employment is E’, but with inflexible 
wages the sector can pay only Wand will obtain only E’ workers. If  wages are 
rigid elsewhere and unemployment is less desirable than working, the loss in 
labor supply is likely to take the form of reduced effort rather than of an actual 
reduction in employment. Relabel the horizontal axis to refer to effort. At the 
“right” wage W’ a given workforce would offer E’  units of effort, whereas at 
Wit will offer just B‘. The loss to the economy is the difference in effort levels 
B‘  and E’. 
While we have not “proved” that inflexibility in wages has sizable first-order 
effects on economic performance, our discussion suggests that it is reasonable 
to treat the costs of  inflexibility on employment or  effort on a par with the 
costs that come from free-riding on the unemployment benefit system in figure 
10.2 above. 
10.4  The Centralized Bargaining Game 
Consider next a centralized bargaining system with three players: the center, 
a union, and a firm. The center’s actions represent peak-level bargaining be- 
tween union and employer federations, and the firm’s  and the union’s actions 
represent lower-level bargaining at the industry or enterprise level. The maxi- 
mands of the three players are the following: 
Union. U = w, -  c(a) + g(w -  w,),  where w,  is the wage floor set by  the 
center, c(a)  is the cost of activity level a (such as effort or investing in skills) 
to workers, w is the wage (so w -  w,  is the amount of drift), and g is the rate 
at which the union values wage drift. (Economically it might seem that g 
should equal one so that the union cares only about the realized wage w,  but 
politically there may be a difference between wage gains granted from on high, 
w,,  and wage drift resulting from bargaining between ongoing players at the 
local level.) 
Firm. nf  = rv(a) -  w,  -  h(w -  w,),  where v(a)  is the revenue function, I  is a 
shift parameter known to the firm and union that affects the value of production 
(perhaps a productivity or price shock), and h is the rate at which wage drift 
costs the firm. (Again, h may differ from one for political reasons.) 
Center. rc  = [rv(a) -  c(a)] -  kw, -  m(w -  w,),  where rv(a) -  c(a)  is social 
output in the sector, k is the rate at which a high central wage settlement harms 354  Richard B. Freeman and Robert S. Gibbons 
the center, and m is the additional cost to the center of  the modeled sector’s 
wage drift. (If the center cares only about realized wages, then m = k.) 
Some comments on this structure: 
1.  The parameter r measures the private information about local conditions 
held by the firm and union but not by the center. It may seem strange that the 
firm and union observe r but that the center does not since the center is the 
amalgam of a federation of firms and a federation of unions. One interpretation 
is that r is realized after the center has determined w,. Another interpretation 
is that political processes within federations (not modeled here) lead firms or 
unions to keep r private information. 
2. The variable w,  is a wage floor so that deviations from the frame involve 
higher wages only. We  assume this because it would be politically difficult for 
a union to settle for less than was recommended by higher-level bargainers. In 
the “no-drift’’  model that follows, w,  is a wage ceiling as well, but in the “full- 
drift” model the firm and union can negotiate a Pareto-improving increase in 
the wage. 
3.  While the firm and union payoffs are standard, the center’s deserves ex- 
planation. We  assume that the center cares about (i) the efficiency of produc- 
tion, as measured by w(a) -  c(a),  but not (directly) about its division between 
the parties; (ii) the cost of inflationary central agreements, as reflected by the 
parameter k; and (iii) the extent of  wage drift from the frame wage w,  as re- 
flected by  the parameter m.  To keep things simple, we assume hereafter that 
m = k, but in a richer model it might be valuable to distinguish between these 
effects. (For example, m might vary across sectors.) Likewise, we  hereafter 
assumeg = h = 1. 
We consider two extreme models: one in which the center can impose such 
severe penalties that there is no drift in the economy, and one in which it cannot 
impose any penalties so that there is full drift. We then offer conjectures about 
a model of partial di-@ that compromises between these extremes. In all three 
models, the  basic  sequence of  decision  making  is  as  follows: the  center 
chooses w,;  observing r;  the firm and the union negotiate w 2 w,;  and, given 
w,  the firm and the union negotiate an activity level, a. In the no-drift case, the 
firm and the union have no choice but to settle on w = w,;  in the full-drift case, 
any w 5  w,  is allowed. In the partial-drift case, the center chooses not only w, 
but also a parameter d representing the maximum allowable percentage wage 
drift: the firm and the union must negotiate a wage w from the interval [w,, 
In  all three cases, we think of the negotiation(s) over activity level as oc- 
curring over the life of the contract and hence after the negotiation over wage 
at the start of the contract. Negotiations over activity level depend (in part) on 
grassroots political forces on the shop floor, whereas firm-union negotiations 
over wage depend (in part) on the character, credibility, and charisma of indi- 
vidual union leaders. It therefore seems plausible that the union’s bargaining 
power differs in these two negotiations. We  use the (generalized) Nash bar- 
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gaining solution to solve each negotiation  but  allow  the union’s  bargaining 
power over wages (4)  to differ from that over activity level (p),  where 0 5  p, 
In the final stage of each model, when the firm and the union negotiate an 
activity level, we assume that, if no settlement is reached, the firm  shuts down, 
yielding payoffs of zero to each party. Thus, given the realization of the produc- 
tivity parameter r and a wage w,  the Nash bargaining solution (generalized to 
arbitrary rather than symmetric bargaining power) solves 
max[w -  c(a)lP[rv(a) -  wI’-P, 
subject to the constraints that w -  c(a) 2  0 and w(a) -  w 2 0. We denote this 
negotiated activity level by aN(<  w). 
To  (help)  ensure that  such  a Nash  bargaining  solution exists, we impose 
conventional regularity conditions: v(0) = c(0) = 0,  v’(0)  >  0 = c’(O), v” <  0 
< c”, and a 2 0, as illustrated in figure 10.4. Even with these assumptions, 
however, no solution exists if w is too large: w must not exceed the cost c(a)  at 
the activity level where  w(a) = c(a),  else the firm  cannot afford to remain 
in business. (Again, see the figure.) Given such a nonbankrupting value of w, 
the negotiated activity level depends on the parties’ bargaining powers, p and 
1 -  p.  The highest possible negotiated activity level earns the union no surplus 
(w  -  c[a] = 0); naturally, this occurs when the union has no bargaining power, 
p  = 0. Similarly, the lowest possible negotiated activity level earns the firm no 
surplus (t-v[a]  -  w = 0); this occurs when p = 1. For an arbitrary p,  the Nash 
bargaining solution uN(~  w)  solves the first-order condition 
4’1. 
U 
pc’(a”(4  -  wl = (1 -  p)w‘(a”  -  c(a)l, 
as illustrated for a small value of p in the figure. 
Given this negotiated activity level in the final stage, we can now work back- 
Fig. 10.4  Nash 
UNION HAS  UNION HAS 
FULL POWER  NO  WWER 
bargaining between firm and union 
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ward to the wage negotiation in the second stage, taking each of the three cases 
in turn. 
10.4.1  Model I: No Drift 
In  the no-drift case, we  assume that the penalties at the center’s disposal 
are sufficiently great that there is never any drift: w -  w,  = 0. In effect, the 
center has a fully enforced wage-control system. This simplifies the payoffs 
to  IT^  = [rv(a) -  c(a)] -  kw,  to the center, nf = rv(a) -  w,  to the firm, and 
U = wo -  c(a) to the union. Since the intermediate stage of  the model (in 
which the firm and the union negotiate over wages) is irrelevant, in the first 
stage the center chooses the wage w,  to solve 
max E,.(rv[a,(r,  wJ1  -  c[aJr,  w,)ll -  kw,. 
wo 
Even in this no-drift case, the center’s optimal wage floor reflects a compromise 
between the center’s two goals: efficient production and wage discipline. Effi- 
cient production requires a positive wage increase, while wage discipline re- 
quires a 0 percent increase. (Here and below, we allow ourselves to use the 
language of wage increases and inflution even though the model concerns wage 
levels.) For example, if the center knew  I; then setting w, = 0 would yield an 
inefficiently low activity level. 
To compute the optimal wage floor wi, the center considers the effect on the 
subsequent activity-level  negotiation of variations in woe  Implicitly differentiat- 
ing the first-order condition for the negotiated activity level (or inspecting fig. 
10.5~)  shows that a,(<  w)  increases with the wage. (The bold and solid vertical 
lines are, respectively, the firm’s and the union’s surpluses at the wage w.  The 
bold dotted and the dotted vertical lines are the analogous surpluses at the 
wage w’.) Roughly speaking, keeping the activity level constant, a higher wage 
benefits the union and harms the firm, so the Nash bargaining solution re- 
dresses this imbalanced distribution of surplus by increasing the activity level. 
The complementary analysis (fig. 103)  shows that the negotiated activity 
level decreases with the productivity parameter I: Here, an increase in r (to r’, 
in  the figure) benefits the firm but has no effect on the union, so the Nash 
bargaining solution reallocates surplus by  decreasing the activity level. Unfor- 
tunately, this response runs directly counter to efficiency considerations: the 
efficient activity level--a*(r),  which maximizes rv(a) -  c(a)-increases  with 
I: The reason the negotiated activity level behaves in this perverse fashion is 
that in this no-drift case the firm is unable to compensate the union for higher 
activity levels, no matter how badly the firm would like to achieve such levels. 
This discordance between the negotiated and the efficient activity levels mo- 
tivates the center to allow wage drift, as we explore below. Alternatively, if the 
center persists in enforcing the present no-drift case (presumably because k is 
large), the firm and the union may  consider breaking away from centralized 
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Fig. 10.5  Comparative statics of Nash bargain 
that the sector might  break  away and so might modify  the choice  of  w,,  to 
discourage such behavior. We conduct only an initial analysis of  the sector's 
incentive to break away, under the assumption that the center chooses w,'  as 
described above. 
To keep things simple, suppose that there are only two values of  I; H >  L. 
Figure 10.5b implies that, given the centrally determined wage w,',  the negoti- 
ated activity level for high-productivity (H)  firms will be less than that for low 
(L),  and figure 10.5~  implies that both these activity.levels increase with w(;. 
Thus, if w,*  is very large, then it could be that both efficient activity levels are 
less than both negotiated activity levels, 
u*(L) < u*(H) < uJH, w,')  < u,(L,  w,'), 
while, if w;  is very small, then it could be that both efficient activity levels are 
greater than both negotiated activity levels, 
u,(H,  w,')  < u,(L,  w,')  < u*(L) < u*(H>. 
It seems likely that the center typically will prefer an intermediate value of wo 
so that neither  of  these  extreme  cases arises. For large enough values of  k 
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the center will prefer the latter extreme over the former since the latter offers a 
much  lower  wage.  This  suggests  that  for  sufficiently  large  k  the  high- 
productivity sectors will operate most inefficiently and so have  the greatest 
incentive to break away from centralized bargaining. 
Basic Point 2. If the center is sufficiently dedicated to wage discipline, then a 
sector’s incentive to abandon the system increases with the value of  the sec- 
tor’s production. 
10.4.2  Model 11: Full Drift 
The polar opposite to central control with no drift is a situation in which the 
firm and the union tailor the wage and the activity level to the realized value 
of the productivity parameter I; without any penalty from the center. This rein- 
vigorates the intermediate stage of  the game: the firm and the union bargain 
over the wage, subject to the constraint that w 2  wo,  taking into account the 
subsequent negotiation over the activity level. 
In this wage negotiation, we assume that, if no settlement were reached, then 
the central agreement w,  would be imposed, after which the firm and the union 
would proceed to negotiate over the activity level as described above. Thus, 
the parties’ threat payoffs are 
Uo = wo  -  4aJl; w,)l 
IT0 = w[a,(l; w,)l -  wg. 
and 
The Nash bargaining solution in the wage negotiation therefore solves 
max  {w -  c[a,(l;  w)]  -  U,}q{w[a,(l; w)]  -  w -  no}’-q, 
w2wo 
subject to the constraints that w -  c[aJl; w)]  2  U,  and rv[a,(l; w)]  -  w 2 IT,, 
where q is the union’s bargaining power over wages. We denote this negotiated 
wage by w,.,(l;  wo). 
The first-order condition for the negotiated wage is 
q(w -  w -  no)  -  (1 -  q)(w -  c -  U,) + a’[(l -  q)(w -  c -  Uo)w’ - 
q(w -  w -  IT,)c‘]  = 0, 
where a’ denotes the partial derivative of uN(l;  w)  with respect to w.  Note that 
the term involving a’ is reminiscent of the first-order condition for the negoti- 
ated activity level, 
pc’(a)[rv(a)  -  wl -  (1 -  p)w’(a)[w  -  c(a)]  = 0. 
More specifically, if q =  p and U, =  IT, = 0,  then the term involving a’ is zero, 
so the first-order condition for  wN(c w,) becomes p(w - w)  = (1 -  p) 
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w  = pw  + (1 -  p)c. 
p(l -  p)c’(a>[n,  -  c] -  p(1 -  p)rv’(a)[n, -  c] = 0, 
The first-order condition for uN(<  w)  then becomes 
or w’ = c’, which defines the efficient activity level a*(r). 
To summarize, we have just shown that, if the union’s bargaining power over 
wages is equal to its bargaining power over activity levels (q = p),  and if the 
payoffs to the union and the firm from abiding by the center’s wage frame w, 
are both zero, then the full-drift model yields the efficient activity level (for 
every realization of r).  Unfortunately (from the perspective of efficient produc- 
tion), these sufficient conditions are also necessary. More precisely, we show 
in the appendix that the full-drift model yields the efficient activity level for 
every realization of r only if p  = q and w, = 0 (where the latter implies U, = 
T,  = 0). Thus, if p differs from q, then there is no way for full drift to achieve 
efficient production. This gives us a result in the spirit of the Coase theorem. 
Basic Point 3. Full drift yields the first best micro-efficient outcome only if the 
unions and management have similar bargaining power in wages and in the 
choice of activity level; differences in bargaining power over the two outcomes 
can produce inefficiency in the same manner as transactions costs. 
When p  differs from q, the center’s optimal choice of  w, involves subtle 
considerations. The wage floor influences the parties’ threat payoffs, U, and 
T,.  Since the center dislikes high wages but likes efficient production, the cen- 
ter would like to choose a wage floor that favors T,  over U,, anticipating that 
the parties’ choice of an activity level will be influenced by efficiency consider- 
ations but that negotiated wages will have to be relatively low to accommodate 
the firm’s high threat payoffs. 
When p  = q, on the other hand, it seems likely that w,  = 0 will be the 
center’s optimal wage floor in this full-drift model-since  lower wage floors 
seem likely to lead to lower negotiated wages, in which case the center can 
achieve efficient production while keeping wages as low as full drift will allow 
them to be kept. The center would be even better off, however, if a little produc- 
tion inefficiency could be traded for still lower wages. To explore this possibil- 
ity, we turn next to the partial-drift model. 
10.4.3  Model 111:  Partial Drift 
The timing of moves in the partial-drift  case is identical to that in the full- 
drift case, except that the center’s move in the first stage now  involves two 
actions rather than one. Whereas in the no-drift and full-drift cases the center 
chose only a wage floor wo,  now the center also chooses a wage-drift parameter 
d. Specifically, if the center chooses w, and d, then the bargaining between the 
firm and the union in the second stage is constrained to produce a wage no less 
than w,  but no greater than w,(l  + d).  Thus, d is the maximum percentage 360  Richard B. Freeman and Robert S. Gibbons 
drift that the center will allow. The no-drift and full-drift cases are limits of this 
partial-drift case (d = 0 and d = 00, respectively). 
We think of the partial-drift case as a one-shot game in which the center can 
commit to any value of d it chooses, but we intend this to be a reduced form 
for a repeated-game  analysis in which the center cannot constrain the firm’s 
and the union’s  current behavior but can later punish a firm-union pair that 
exceeds the current limit on drift. When the Swedish system was in its heyday, 
such punishments were available. For example, both LO and SAF had large 
strike funds that could be used to reward members that stayed within the guide- 
lines  for drift  but  could  also be withheld  to punish  members  who strayed 
outside. 
In a world in which partial drift operates, the inefficiencies of both the no- 
drift and the full-drift models will likely reappear, albeit in muted fashion. The 
center can trade off the wage discipline/grossly inefficient activity levels from 
the  no-drift  case  against  the  more  efficient  productioduncontrolled wages 
from the full-drift case. But this trade-off will not produce fully efficient pro- 
duction with tightly controlled wages. 
It seems reasonable to conjecture that the center will find it optimal to allow 
more wage drift if production inefficiencies become more important, such as 
would occur if the population distribution of r increased in variance. Section 
10.5 describes (among other things) the growth (and eventual explosion) of 
wage drift that preceded the decline of centralized bargaining in Sweden. The 
fact that even full drift may not yield efficient production (say, becausep differs 
from q)  seems consistent with the Swedish experience: if production efficiency 
becomes sufficiently important (and controlling wages sufficiently unimport- 
ant), then the institution of centralized bargaining may be unable to persist. 
To  conclude this section, we elaborate on this and other implications of our 
three models. 
10.4.4  Implications of the Analysis 
In our model, three things create problems for a centralized wage-setting 
system: 
1. An increase in the dispersion of desired outcomes across existing sectors. 
This will take the form of a greater dispersion in r across sectors. High-r sec- 
tors have an incentive to opt out of the system. 
2. An increase in the heterogeneity of  groups covered by  the agreement, 
through the addition of new groups. In our framework, this also takes the form 
of a greater dispersion in 1. The more heterogeneous the groups covered by the 
central agreement, the more likely some groups will have relatively high values 
of r and thus consider a defect strategy. 
3. A reduction in the importance of controlling inflation through centralized 
negotiations. A decline in the benefits curve in figure 10.1 above makes central- 
ized bargaining less valuable. In our models, this takes the form of a reduced 
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Our analyses suggest that decentralization could take the form of a growth 
of drift in a centralized system or of bargaining pairs opting out of the system 
if the center does not allow enough drift. These considerations seem to be 
relevant  to  the  ongoing  decentralization of  centralized  bargaining  in  the 
OECD. The widening of wage differentials in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, the countries that give greatest leeway to the market in wage setting, 
implies that developed-country economic conditions favor an increase in dis- 
persion of labor market outcomes. The increased organization of white-collar 
and public-sector workers in unions in Europe in the  1970s created greater 
heterogeneity of interests in the organized sector. The worldwide drop in infla- 
tion meant that the gains from controlling inflation through centralized wage 
setting had fallen. If this analysis is correct, countries with greater market pres- 
sures for wage differentiation,  with greater growth of organization of nontradi- 
tional union groups, and facing the least threat of serious wage inflation were 
likely to have moved furthest down the decentralization path. Rather than com- 
paring different countries, however, our empirical analysis examines changes 
in the country that has moved most dramatically toward decentralized bar- 
gaining: Sweden. 
10.5  Does the Model Illuminate the Swedish Case? 
With the highest union density in the OECD and extensively organized em- 
ployers’ associations, Sweden has long been viewed as the archetype of cen- 
tralized collective bargaining, ranked at or near the top in corporatism rates. 
The explicit consideration that LO and SAF gave national economic conditions 
made Sweden the leading example of the all-encompassing unionism that can 
deliver socially desirable outcomes (Olson 1990). But, from the early  1980s 
through the early 1990s, employers refused to enter into peak-level negotia- 
tions, and even sought to decentralize the industry negotiations, giving much 
greater leeway for decentralized wage setting. Even in this traditional exemplar 
of corporatism, centralized bargaining was not what it had once been. 
Does our model capture essential features of  the Swedish experience? In 
this section, we give a schematic description of Sweden’s peak-level bargaining 
system and its evolution over time and then examine this bottom-line question. 
10.5.1  The Traditional Centralized Bargaining System 
Following other analysts (Ahlen 1989; Swenson 1989; Elster 1989; Martin 
1984, 1992; Lundberg 1985; Nilsson 1993) we identify two major players in 
Sweden’s traditional peak-level bargaining system. The first is LO, a strong 
central federation dominated by  private-sector blue-collar workers, to which 
major unions gave a mandate to negotiate. The second is SAF, the private em- 
ployer’s association, with the mandate to negotiate for firms. However, we also 
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divided along skill lines: TCO, which organises white-collar workers; and 
SACO/SR, which covers professional workers. 
Table 10.1 gives a brief chronology of  the development of  the traditional 
system through its decay in the 1980s. The 1940s set the stage for centraliza- 
tion. In  1938, following considerable labor turmoil, LO and SAF reached the 
Saltsjobaden agreement to cooperate to resolve labor disputes. LO strength- 
ened its authority over member unions by restricting their rights to strike with- 
out LO approval, allowing the LO executive board to participate in member 
unions’ contract negotiations and to intervene in proposed settlements, and 
making union leaders rather than members the final authority in negotiations 
and dispute strategy. In  1944, LO founded TCO, the white-collar workers’ 
union, to bring these weakly unionized workers into the labor movement. SAF 
and LO reached agreements on workplace rules and wage setting, and LO sup- 
ported wage freezes as part of the Social Democrats’ wartime economic policy. 
In the 1950s, fearful that interindustry rivalry would produce a wage explo- 
sion harmful to the country’s trade position, SAF pressed for centralized nego- 
tiations. It refused to allow its members to negotiate separately with unions 
until a central agreement was struck, forcing LO unions to give the right to 
bargain to LO, although many preferred local bargaining. Union support for 
centralization grew as leaders realized that it offered a mechanism for solida- 
ristic wage policies beneficial to low-wage workers, reduced labor disputes, 
and lowered the risk of inflationary settlements that endangered full employ- 
ment and would harm the union-allied Social Democrats. Both LO and SAF 
seemed to have  sufficient tools to make central agreements effective. Under 
the rules of LO, the leaders of unions (who are on the LO executive council) 
rather than union members had the authority to confirm agreements. The lead- 
ers gave the federation a mandate to make “frame agreements” with SAF that 
set the parameters for lower-level bargaining. Unions engaged in disputes out- 
side the frame faced the highly organized employers on their own, whereas 
workers on approved strikes received essentially full pay from individual union 
and federation strike funds. On the employer side, centralization was nomi- 
nally stronger. Member firms and employer associations gave  SAF the right 
to negotiate an agreement on their behalf. SAF had  to approve lower-level 
agreements  and  lockouts  and  could  fine  firms  that  violated  the  central 
agreement, although it rarely did. SAF raised a large insurance fund available 
for firms that were struck or engaged in an approved lockout. Strengthening 
the importance of the central agreement, Sweden’s labor courts treated the LO- 
SAF agreement as the legal norm: “In practice, unorganized employers thus 
are dependent on  the agreements made by  the large organizations” (Skogh 
1984, 150). 
Most analysts view the 1960s as the heyday of the centralized system. LO 
and SAF signed two- and three-year central agreements that dominated wage 
setting. Wage drift was moderate. LO’S wage-solidarity policy reduced differ- 
entials noticeably (Hibbs and Locking 1991). no  events, however, portended 
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Table 10.1  Decadal Chronology of Industrial Relations Development 
1938-1 940s: Development of cooperative arrangements  -  Saltsjobaden Agreement (1938) establishes procedures for settling disputes 
SAF-LO set national wage agreements for war period; reach cooperative agreements on 
works councils, time and motion studies, etc. 
LO establishes greater control over member unions; founds TCO in 1944 
1950s-1960s:  Successful centralized negotiating system  -  SAF pushes for centralized wage setting in 1950s; few strikes and limited wage drift 
Public-sector workers given right to strike in 1966 
Earnings development guarantee in LO contracts in  1966 
LO pushes wage solidarity; reduces differentials 
Miners wildcat strike for higher differentials, better conditions in 1969 
1970s: Centralized system under pressure 
Volvo workers strike for wages above central agreement; wage drift rises  -  LO uses legislation to win role at workplace it cannot gain in bargaining: employee 
participation legislation requires provision of information, right to strike on codetermination 
issues, 1976; bitter dispute over proposed wages fund 
In 1971, government emergency legislation imposes settlement on professional workers in 
public sector within central agreement 
Oil shock produces massive wage inflation in 1974-75;  devaluations needed to restore 
competitiveness 
White-collar union cartel (PTK) strikes in 1976 
* 
* 
1980s: System lurches toward decentralization 
Massive 1980 lockout/strike viewed as “investment for future” by employers 
SAF-LO-F’TK 1982 agreement on local level efficiency and participation, strengthening local 
unions 
Strikes and lockouts by white-collar and public-sector workers: 1981 PTK strike opposed by 
LO; TCO massive public-sector strike in 1985; additional public-sector strikes to maintain 
guarantees in 1986; SIF strikes VIF to gain greater union influence on local pay in 1988 
LO weakens solidarity wage policy in 1987 to favor differentials at top 
Private sector led by VF moves to decentralize private-sector bargaining; VF does not give 
mandate to SAF in  1983, bargains separately with white-collar unions; no central bargain in 
1988; SAF refuses to bargain centrally in 1990 
Public-sector decentralizes: police gain higher settlement in 1989; SACO-SAV agree to 
individual negotiations for top civil servants; SAV decentralize negotiations for teachers and 
nurses 
Government seeks bigger role in wage setting: 1984-85  Rosebund meetings; 1989 failure to 
impose national price-wage freezeho strike central agreement 
1990s: Decentralized collective bargaining  -  No central agreement in 1990 
Rehnderg Commission secures national wage settlement 
Industry agreements allow greater discretion for lower-level parties to differentiate wages 
even absent drift 
ployees, strengthening their unions, and a 1969 wildcat strike by miners in the 
state-owned mining  company owing to miners’ opposition to central settle- 
ments that restricted local union independence (and that lowered their pay rela- 
tive to other blue-collar workers and to white-collar workers in mining). 
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bargaining under great stress. Volvo workers struck in 1970 and gained an  11 
percent wage increase (compared to 3 percent in the SAF-LO agreement), 
lower wage differentials within the company, and other benefits. High demand 
for labor and a limited supply of workers for production jobs made Volvo un- 
willing to weather a labor dispute for the sake of the central agreement. Work- 
ers struck other profitable companies for a share of “excess profits” and then 
struck less profitable companies to restore relativities. The centralized system 
forced only one group into line, university graduates working for the state. It 
did this by enacting emergency legislation in 197  1  that imposed a modest wage 
settlement on these workers over the opposition of their unions. While some 
Swedish observers cite this as demonstrating the ability of the centralized sys- 
tem to enforce the frame agreement, in fact it was an isolated instance in a 
period when most wildcat strikes succeeded. 
One might expect centralized bargaining to be ideally suited to deal with 
the 1970s supply-side oil price explosion, but the Swedish system did not fare 
well. Wage drift produced huge wage increases in  1974 despite a moderate 
central settlement; the frame agreement and wage drift combined to produce 
even larger nominal increases in 1975. Wage inflation was greater than in any 
other advanced OECD country save Japan. A wave of wildcat strikes swept the 
country in 1974. Reflecting the failure of  the central agreement to cap wage 
increases, industry and local bargaining pairs wrote earnings guarantees and 
cost-of-living adjustments into contracts. (Earnings guarantees are clauses as- 
suring workers with little opportunity for drift  that, if, say, Volvo  workers 
earned 5 percent over the negotiated settlement, they would get the same.) 
Union rivalry was increasingly important in wage setting. 
A different set of problems surfaced in the mid-1970s when LO pressed 
the Social Democrats for legislation opening company books to unions and 
establishing codetermination at workplaces. Employers fought against a union 
proposal for wage-earner funds to be paid by taxes on profits. Employers felt 
that LO’S use of political muscle to gain benefits they could not win in bar- 
gaining violated the spirit of Saltsjobaden for cooperative agreements between 
the “social partners.” 
Finally, in the 1980s, the centralized bargaining system began to disinte- 
grate. In 1980, there was a massive national lockout and strike that the head 
of  SAF labeled “an investment in the future” for reducing the power of LO. 
Substantial wage increases in 1981-82 required a devaluation of the currency 
to restore competitiveness on world markets and company profitability. No 
longer  deferring  to  the  central  agreement,  white-collar  and  public-sector 
unions battled employers in major labor disputes. Public-sector workers struck 
unsuccessfully in 1986 to maintain earnings guarantees in contracts. In 1988, 
the private-sector clerical union, SIF, struck unsuccessfully for three weeks 
against major multinationals to gain a greater influence in local wage setting 
(a key to union power because of wage drift). Led by the large multinationals 365  The Decline of Centralized Collective Bargaining 
of the engineering employers’ association (VF), employers started to decentral- 
ize the bargaining system. In 1983,  VF met separately with white-collar unions 
and Metall, sidestepping the central agreement. SAF negotiated no central bar- 
gain in 1988. State efforts to rejuvenate centralized bargaining in  1989 failed 
when the municipal employees union rejected a government-sponsored price- 
wage  freezeho-strike  agreement that  LO  and  some  large  employers  had 
worked out. In  1990, SAF disbanded its negotiating division and announced 
the end of centralized bargaining. In the public sector, the university graduates’ 
union pushed for more decentralized bargaining and individual negotiations 
for top civil servants. The policemen’s union won a favorable contract and 
threatened to leave TCO because the federation had not supported their de- 
mands. In  1990, SAV  stopped negotiating centrally with the teachers’ and 
nurses’ unions, and bargaining authority devolved to local governments. In 
1993, employers insisted that industry bargaining would leave greater leeway 
to local parties to determine the allocation of changes in aggregate wages, ef- 
fectively decentralizing a greater part of the wage bargain, even absent drift. 
In contrast to some other centralized wage-setting systems, such as that of 
Austria, Swedish unions, firms, or sectoral employers’ associations voluntarily 
chose to bargain at the peak level rather than separately. This meant that LO 
and SAF had to develop goals and reach agreements acceptable to member 
unions and firms, creating a coordinated bargaining structure: An institutional 
arrangement through which unions (and firms) could arrive at and carry out a 
common policy (Martin 1992, 49; 1995). In addition, since white-collar and 
public-employee unions bargain separately, LO and SAF had to consider how 
these groups would respond to the central agreement; these two second-movers 
created great problems as their sizes increased. In principle, the key players in 
the LO-SAF bargaining arrangement were the major export employers and 
their blue-collar workers. The Swedish model envisaged central bargainers set- 
ting wages to maintain competitiveness on world markets, with unions and 
employers in protected sectors and white-collar workers following the lead of 
the major private LO union, Metall, and the associated employers’ association, 
VF.  Our analysis stresses that the group most likely to want to pull out of  a 
central agreement that imposes “too much” wage discipline is a sector with 
high K This appears to be the case in Sweden, with Metall and VF leading the 
breakup of the centralized system. 
Our analysis also stresses that the growth of new organizations (more pre- 
cisely, an increase in the heterogeneity of the population of bargainers) makes 
centralized bargaining arrangements more difficult. Table 10.2 measures labor 
and management organization in Sweden from 1950 to 1988/89. Row  1 docu- 
ments Sweden’s extraordinary rate of unionization, which grew from 50 per- 
cent of the workforce in  1950 to peak at 88 percent in  1980, after which it 
began to fall gradually. Row 2 gives the distribution of union members among 
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share of unionized workers reflects the successful organization of white-collar 
workers in the 1950s and 1960s and to a lesser extent the declining blue-collar 
share of the overall workforce. Row 3 shows a major change in the composition 
of the workforce in LO, from private-sector employees to public-sector work- 
ers, as employment growth in the public sector and increased unionization 
made the union of central government employees and the union of local gov- 
ernment employees major players within LO. By  1989, the union of local gov- 
ernment employees had  more members than the leading industrial workers 
union, Metall. Row 4 summarizes the changing shares of  the workforce by 
union status in terms of LO-associated private-sector unions, LO-associated 
public-sector unions, and SACO/SR-associated unions. It shows that the LO 
private share of the workforce was as large in 1988/89 as in 1950, which high- 
lights the fact that it was the growth of other organized groups, not any decline 
in LO private unionization, that reduced the LO private union importance in 
the organized labor market. 
The next part of table 10.2 turns to the employer side of the market. Row 5 
estimates the percentage of  all workers working for firms affiliated with an 
employers’ federation: a remarkable 82 percent. Row 6 gives the percentage 
of  private-sector workers in SAF-associated firms: the figures in the  1980s 
were on the order of 55 percent. Because LO does not represent white-collar 
workers, however, only a third of private-sector workers are directly covered 
by  SAF-LO bargaining. Nearly a quarter are covered by  bargaining between 
white-collar unions, who bargain together in the PTK bargaining consortium, 
and SAE An additional 15 percent of private employees work in firms that are 
members of  other associations, notably banking, newspapers, and consumer 
cooperatives. In total, roughly 80 percent of private workers are employed in 
firms who are members of employer associations. Row 7 shows the percentage 
of public-sector workers whose employers are members of associations. Here, 
membership is universal for workers employed by  the central government, 
whose agencies form the employers’ federation SAV,  and extremely high (81 
percent) for workers employed in public bodies associated with the association 
of local and county employers. Finally, row  8 gives the estimated share of 
workers in the various employer-union bargaining pairs. In 1988/89, only 28 
percent of the workforce was covered by LO-SAF bargaining, compared to 34 
percent of the workforce covered by local public-sector bargaining. This con- 
trasts sharply with the situation in the 1950s and 1960s. By the 1970s, LO and 
SAF could no longer dominate the organized sector. Instead of a single leading 
bargaining pair and a large fringe of followers, Swedish collective bargaining 
expanded  to  include  important  white-collar  and  public-sector  bargaining 
groups. 
We  speculate that centralized bargaining dominated by  LO private-sector 
unions and SAF potentially contributed to Sweden’s unionization of  white- 
collar and public-sector workers through “defensive unionization.” This re- 
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Table 10.2  Percentage of Workers, by Union Confederation and Employer 
Association in Sweden, 1950-89 
1950  1960  1970  1980  1988/89 
Union confederation 
1. Percentage of all workers who 
2. Percentage of union members who are: 
are unionized  51 
LO (blue collar)  80 
TCO (white collar)  17 
SACO/SR (professional)  3 
Private  80 
Public  20 
3. Percentage of LO members who are: 
4. Percentage of all workers who are: 
LO private sector  33 
LO public sector  7 
Non-LO union  10 
Employer association 
5. Percentage of  all workers in 
firms who are members of 
6. Percentage of  private-sector 
workers in firms in SAF 
Wage earners (LO)  ... 
Salaried (PTK)  ... 
employers’ associations  ... 
... 
7. Percentage of workers in units in 
associations: 
Central government (SAV)  ... 
Local association  ... 
Bargaining areas 
8.  Percentage of workers in major 
bargaining areas, by group: 
Private wage (LO-SAF)  ... 
Salaried (PTK-SAF)  ... 
Public central (All-SAV)  ... 













































































Sources: Swedish Statistical  Yearbook (Statistisk  Arsbok  for Sverige); Nilsson (1993). 
toward white-collar and skilled workers and employers due to market forces 
further eroded the economic rationale of  wage-solidarity policies. The result 
was that frame bargaining delivered neither the noninflationary wage settle- 
ments that are the sine qua non of centralized arrangements nor economically 
appropriate wage differentials. 368  Richard B. Freeman and Robert S. Gibbons 
Appendix 
We  show here that the full-drift model yields the efficient activity level for 
every realization of  r only if p = q and w, = 0. First, recall that the first-order 
condition for the negotiated activity level uN(r,  w)  is 
(Al) 
and that the first-order condition for the efficient activity level a*(r)  is w’(a)  = 
c’(a).  Thus, to  achieve aN(r,  w)  = a*(r) for every  r,  we  must  have  w  = 
Now recall that the first-order condition for the negotiated wage wN(<  wo)  is 
pc’(a)[rv(a) -  w] = (1 -  p)rv’(a)[w  -  c(a)] 
pw[a*(r)l + (1 -  p>c[a*(r)l. 
(A2) 
where a’ denotes the partial derivative of a,,,,(<  w)  with respect to w. Substitut- 
ing w = prv[a*(r)]  + (1 -  p)c[a*(r)]  and w’[a*(r)]  = c‘[a*(r)]  into (A2) 
yields 
643) 
Computing a’ from (Al), and substituting w = prv[u*(r)]  + (1 -  p)c[a*(r)] 
and rv’[a*(r)]  = c’[a*(r)]  into the expression for a’ shows that 1 -  a’c’ > 0, 
so (A3) becomes 
(A41 
for every I:  Since U, = w, -  c[aN(r,  w,)] and IT,  = rv[a,(r,  w,)] -  w,, (A4) be- 
comes 
q(rv -  w -  IT,)  -  (1 -  q)(w -  c -  U,) + 
a”(1 -  q)(w -  c -  V,)rv’ -  q(rv -  w -  IT,)C’]  = 0, 
{q[(1 -  P)(W -  c) -  no1 - 
(1 -  q)  [p(rv -  c) -  U,]}(l  -  a’c‘) = 0. 
(4 -  P)(N -  c) = qn, -  (1 -  qw, 
(A5)  (4 -  p){w[a*(r)l -  c[a*(r)l} =  qrv[‘N(c  wO>l  -  wO  + 
(l -  q)c[aN(6  wO)l 
for every I: 
The argument thus far establishes a first interesting result. Stated formally, 
there is no interval of values of w, such that the full-drift model achieves effi- 
cient production for every realization of r (because the right-hand side of equa- 
tion (A5) varies with w, but the left does not). Stated informally, it is not true 
that there is a (positive) critical value of w,  such that, if the center chooses any 
wage floor below the critical value, then the wage floor is irrelevant in the sense 
that for any value of r the parties renegotiate the wage and achieve the efficient 
activity level. 
We  show next that (A5) holds for every r only if p  = q and w,, = 0. Since 
the efficient activity level a*(r)  approaches zero as r approaches zero, the left- 
hand side of (A5) approaches zero as r approaches zero, so wo  must equal zero 
because rv[a,,,,(r,  w,)] and c[aN(l;  w,)] approach zero as r approaches zero. But, 
if  w, = 0, then v[aN(r,  w,)] and c[a,(s  w,)] are zero, so the right-hand side of 369  The Decline of Centralized Collective Bargaining 
(A5) is zero for every I; so we must have p = q. An informal discussion of this 
result is given in the text. 
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